



# P2P Networks – Exercise Solution For Exercise # 7

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# 1. Overlays (1/2)

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- What can go wrong with overlays?
  - Overlay neighborhood is not real neighborhood – induces delay
  - Useless traffic traverse over the same physical link – stress
- How can we handle load-balancing problems in overlays?
  - [Look at DHASH]
- Can we create location aware overlay?
  - We can, by using characteristics of lower layer during overlay constructions



# 1 Overlays (2/2)

- Can we create a „location aware“ overlay?
  - BTW: what is „location“ on the Internet?
    - Darmstadt (DFN) -> Berlin (DFN) can be a lot „closer“ than Darmstadt (DFN) -> Weiterstadt (DSL)!
- Common (mis-) used metrics:
  - RTT (ECHO, ping)
    - But: DSL without fastpath has ping times like TU-Darmstadt -> Vanuatu...
  - Bandwidth between end-hosts
    - Which bandwidth? Overall? Available? How do we measure that?
  - IP-Hops
    - Stuttgart is in same distance cmp. to New York ([www.dfn.de](http://www.dfn.de) vs [www.ny.com](http://www.ny.com))



## 2. 1. Is Chord a DHT?

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- Chord does not provide complete functionalities of a DHT
  - It does not provide storage of  $\langle \text{key}, \text{value} \rangle$  pairs
  - Does not associate values with identifiers
- Chord is a scalable lookup service
  - It associates keys with values
  - Successor lookup function is implemented in Chord



## 2. 2) DHASH

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- DHASH is layered Chord application
- Uses Chord as a lookup service
  - Insert ()
  - Lookup ()
- Layer 1: Chord – Maps identifiers to successor nodes
- Layer 2: DHASH – Associate values with identifiers
- Layer 3: Application – provide a file system interface



## 2. 3) DoS Attacks

- Pruning links
  - Resistant against DoS attacks because of network locality
- Polluting with large amount of data
  - Flushing legitimate values from distributed storage
  - Limiting the number of blocks a single node stores
  - Limiting relation among nodes in the system
- Picking own identifier
  - Could delete data by positioning themselves as successor of data
  - Using strong ID =  $\text{hash}(\text{IP}, \dots)$  could provide prevention
- Arbitrarily incorrect behavior
  - Monitoring and verifying nodes' responses with others
    - Mutual verification to verifying node's responses
  - There is no way to proof malicious activities of a group of nodes



## 2. 4) Load Balancing

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- Avoid to store complete document on a node
  - Splitting files into blocks
  - Insert each block into the DHASH layer with the hash of the block
- Spread a single file among several nodes
- Use meta-data to provide a single name for a distributed, multi-blocked file



# Programming Exercise - Routing Table

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- RPC Identifiers?
  - Provides safety against forged messages.
  - Eases parsing when many messages travel around.
  
- Sender Identifiers?
  - Ping works without.
  - Eases parsing Pong.
  - Enables Backward learning!
  
- Kademlia design specification  
<http://xlattice.sourceforge.net/components/protocol/kademlia/specs.html>





# Next?

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- There will be no theory/programming exercise during winter break
- So, Merry Christmas and Happy New Year